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Preface
by EIB President Philippe Maystadt
Well-functioning infrastructure 
networks are the backbone of 
prospering economies. Europe is 
facing large infrastructure investment 
needs over the coming decade. A 
significant part of the existing capital 
stock comes up for renewal in the 
old Member States, while the new 
Member States still have scope for 
raising the infrastructure capital 
stock. In addition, new investment needs arise with population ageing 
and climate change. 
This raises the question how infrastructure investment can be financed, 
at a time when many European countries experience tighter fiscal 
constraints from the economic and financial crisis. This is also a question 
of utmost importance for the European Investment Bank, since 
infrastructure finance has been one of its core responsibilities since its 
creation in 1958. Financing infrastructure-related projects still accounted 
for about half of the EIB’s total lending in the European Union in the 
2005-09 period. Against this background, the Bank has a continuing 
interest in maintaining a thorough understanding of the economics of 
infrastructure and its financing.
With this perspective in mind, a number of questions were addressed to 
the researchers and policy analysts presenting at the 2010 EIB Conference 
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in Economics and Finance. First, how do the economics of infrastructure 
influence the way it would be optimally financed? In light of current fiscal 
constraints, is it possible to increase the fraction of infrastructure 
investment that is privately financed? What regulatory and other 
institutional changes are needed to make this happen? A second group 
of questions related to how infrastructure assets are perceived by private 
institutional investors such as pension funds. Do infrastructure-backed 
financial instruments represent a unique asset class? Do they have 
specific characteristics that make them particularly attractive to long-
term financial investors? A third group of questions related to the 
intersection between public policy objectives and private infrastructure 
finance. Is it possible to increase the share of privately financed 
infrastructure and still be able to address key public policy issues such as 
climate change and economic development? 
The contributions to the 2010 EIB Conference provided enlightening 
insights into these policy questions. The main messages are summarised 
in this conference review. Volume 15 (2010) of the EIB Papers – available 
on request in hardcopy and also electronically on the EIB web site – 
contain the complete papers presented at the conference.Financing infrastructure  5           6             Financing infrastructure
 
1.    Key facts and figures on 
infrastructure finance
The financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009 triggered a fiscal 
deterioration that caused public debt to rise precipitously in many 
countries, in Europe and beyond. The need for fiscal retrenchment in 
coming years will likely put further pressure on governments to find 
alternative sources of financing for their infrastructure investments. But 
the crisis has also shown – as is known from previous downturns – that 
private financing of infrastructure is procyclical. Furthermore, while the 
need for private infrastructure finance is greater than ever, it will only 
come forth in sufficient amounts if governments have a solid 
understanding of the specific incentives, information problems and risks 
that confront private investors in infrastructure, as well as the will to 
address them. 
Setting the stage at the 2010 EIB Conference, EIB Economist 
Rien Wagenvoort (presenting a paper written together with EIB 
colleagues Carlo de Nicola and Andreas Kappeler, published as 
Wagenvoort et al. 2010 in the EIB Papers) provided some key facts 
and figures on infrastructure investment and its financing in 
Europe. The focus was on the roles of public and private financing 
of infrastructure and the evolution across time of financial 
instruments used. 
Seen in a longer historical perspective, the balance of financing, 
owning and operating infrastructure assets has shifted between 
the public and private sectors in long cycles, lasting decades and even 
centuries. Private financing of infrastructure occurred already in ancient 
Greece and Rome, and was given a modern form under the Napoleonic code. 
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The twentieth century saw an expanded role of the public sector in 
financing and operating infrastructure, including schools, hospitals, and 
transportation, water and energy networks. A number of known reasons 
contributed to this. For instance, many infrastructure networks have 
natural monopolistic properties, which undermine competition as a 
device to contain prices. In this case, public provision was seen as a means 
to contain prices. But the problem could also be the opposite. Oftentimes 
charging users was so difficult that private provision would not be 
forthcoming in sufficient amounts. Furthermore, governments also 
maintained public ownership of infrastructure assets on equity grounds. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, nevertheless, private 
financing and operation of infrastructure assets has re-emerged on a 
large scale. Partly, this can be explained by new technological 
developments that reduce the transaction costs of introducing user fees. 
Improved regulatory frameworks were also increasingly seen as an 
alternative to public ownership in avoiding excessive monopolistic 
pricing or regulatory capture. Other factors driving this shift include a 
greater political acceptance of the principle that users rather than tax 
payers pay for infrastructure, and increased perception that private 
operation and financing of infrastructure have incentive effects that 
foster efficiency gains. But perhaps the decisive factor for a growing 
private role in financing and operating infrastructure has been the fiscal 
constraints facing governments, even though the actual economic case 
for this is weak (see Välilä et al., 2005, and Engel et al., 2010).
Shedding light on infrastructure finance is a needed but non-trivial task, 
complicated by the confusing diversity of definitions and measurements. 
In the national accounts, one can find public investment. But this is a 
broader concept, which also includes public goods such as law and order, 
defence, and environmental protection, as well as redistributive functions 
such as social protection, public housing and recreation. Infrastructure 
can be said to consist of two main elements (although exact definitions 
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education and health sectors (i.e., schools and hospitals). Economic 
infrastructure includes physical structures that serve as common inputs 
in production, in areas such as transport, communications and energy.1 
Data on infrastructure investment, let alone its financing sources, are not 
available in any ready-to-use form. Drawing on a variety of sources, 
Wagenvoort et al. nevertheless succeed in calculating a workable 
estimate of infrastructure investment on the basis of a consistent 
methodology. As a starting point, national account statistics from 
Eurostat are used to construct estimates of total and government 
investment in “infrastructure sectors”. Private investment is then derived 
as the residual. Infrastructure is not a subset of public investment, since it 
also contains private infrastructure investment. Further sectoral 
breakdown is provided using data on gross fixed capital formation in 
individual “infrastructure sectors”, i.e. the education, health, transport, 
and utility sectors (the latter comprising energy, water supply, sewage, 
and waste management). These aggregates tend to overestimate, 
however, true infrastructure investment at the sectoral level, since they 
also cover non-infrastructure investment. Total investment in the 
transport sector, for instance, includes the acquisition of trucks, and 
furthermore lumps together the transport sector with storage and 
communication2. 
The private infrastructure aggregates are then broken down further with 
the help of data from Projectware, which allow for the distinction 
between investments made through Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs, i.e. 
projects) and direct corporate investment in infrastructure sectors. SPVs 
allow investors to provide financing against the cashflows of a particular 
project, while corporate investment also exposes investors to risks 
associated with non-infrastructure related activities. With the help of 
these data, corporate investment is finally computed as the difference 
1  See Chan et al. (2009).
2    For a more complete discussion on statistical caveats and data limitations, see Wagenvoort et 
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between total private and private project investment. Project investment 
can be further divided into Public-Private Partnership (PPP) projects and 
non-PPP projects, using data described in Kappeler and Nemoz (2010). 
Since most PPP finance is entirely private, non-PPP private project finance 
can be approximated simply as the difference between total private 
project investment and PPP investment. The resulting infrastructure 
finance decomposition is summarized in Figure 1. Note that the terms 
investment and finance are used interchangeably. 












Source: Wagenvoort et al. (2010)
The government and private sectors in turn use several different 
instruments to finance their investment. Government finance consists 
mostly of taxes and borrowing. Private finance is made up of loans, 
bonds, and equity. User fees can be used to reward these financial 
instruments once the infrastructure is up and running, but are not 
available during the construction phase.
Figures 2 and 3 provide a breakdown of infrastructure finance by 
institutional sector and by sector of activity. On average in the EU, 
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investment, with most of the rest consisting of corporate infrastructure 
investment. This latter segment includes for example utility and transport 
companies. Note that infrastructure investment is classified as corporate 
even when occurring in government-owned businesses. Around one-
tenth of infrastructure investment is in the form of project finance. 
Transport is the single largest infrastructure sector by investment, 
accounting for more than half of total investment. Utilities (i.e. energy, 
water, waste and sewage) come second.
Figure 2:    Composition of infrastructure finance across institutional 
sectors (2006-2009 average, in percent of GDP)
Non-PPP project PPP Corporate Government











Source: Eurostat, Projectware, EIB/EPEC 
The sources of finance differ markedly across sectors (see Figure 4). Public 
sources dominate education infrastructure finance in most countries. In 
contrast, private sources provide two-thirds or more of infrastructure 
finance in the health, transport and utility sectors. Within private finance, 
corporate finance is the dominant form. PPPs account for 5% of total Financing infrastructure  11           
finance in the transport sector and 2% in the utility sector. Non-PPP 
project finance is negligible in all sectors except in utilities, where it 
accounts for 16% of the total.
Figure 3.    Composition of infrastructure finance across sectors of 
activity (2006-2009 average, in percent of GDP)
Education Health Utilities Transport











Source:  Eurostat, Projectware, EIB/EPEC 
As for the evolution over time, total government investment as a ratio to 
GDP fell from almost 5% in the 1970s to less than 2.5% at the turn of the 
century. Since the infrastructure share in overall government investment 
is known to have remained fairly stable over time, it follows that 
government infrastructure investment has also declined over time, 
relative to GDP. However, this downward trend has levelled off in the last 
ten years. While private financing of infrastructure investment has tended 
to rise over time, this has occurred on too small a scale to offset the 
decline in public finance. Hence, also the sum total of public and private 
infrastructure investment has trended down as a share of GDP.12             Financing infrastructure
 
Figure 4.    Composition of infrastructure finance across sources, by 
sector of activity (2006-2009 EU average, in percent of GDP)







Education Health Utilities Transport
Source:  Eurostat, Projectware, EIB/EPEC
Wagenvoort et al. also explore the evolution of infrastructure investment 
and finance in recent years and confirm earlier findings of a procyclical 
pattern. This is particularly visible with respect to private finance. During 
the latest crisis there has been a pronounced shift back towards publicly 
financed infrastructure investment. While private sources have fallen 
precipitously, public funding has been sustained and even slightly 
increased, partly as a stabilising response to the economic downturn. 
However, given the need for significant and sustained fiscal consolidation, 
the medium-term outlook for public infrastructure finance in Europe 
appears bleak.Financing infrastructure  13           
2.    The economics of infrastructure 
finance: PPPs vs. public provision
The financing of infrastructure is to a large extent determined by its 
economic characteristics. Specifically, infrastructure investment tends to 
involve large up-front fixed costs, followed by a low marginal cost for 
each additional user once the fixed capital is in place. Combined with the 
long average lifespan of many infrastructure assets, this poses a challenge 
both for private investors, who need to recuperate their costs, and for 
governments, who would like to ensure that essential infrastructure 
services are made available in sufficient amounts and on equitable terms, 
while also being produced efficiently. 
Eduardo Engel (Yale University, presenting a paper written 
together with Ronald Fischer and Alexander Galetovic, published 
as Engel et al. 2010 in the EIB Papers) provided key insights on this 
nexus between the economics and financing of infrastructure. 
The paper concentrates on the differences between public 
provision and Public Private Partnerships (PPPs). 
Engel et al. begin by observing that PPPs have in recent years 
become increasingly popular as an alternative to traditional 
public provision of infrastructure. Projects that require large 
upfront investments, such as highways, light rails, bridges, 
seaports and airports, water and sewage, hospitals and schools are now 
often provided via PPPs. The basic set-up of a PPP contract is that it 
bundles investment and service provision of infrastructure into a single 
long-term contract. A group of private investors finances and manages 
the construction of the project, then maintains and operates the facilities 
for a long period of usually 20 to 30 years. There is a stark contrast 
between PPPs and privatisation. Under a PPP, the government typically 
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bears some of the demand risk during the operation phase, and the 
assets are returned to the government at the end of the contract. In the 
case of privatisation, the link between the project and the government 
budget is permanently severed, as the project is sold for a one-time 
payment and all risk is transferred to the firm. 
The growth and spread of PPPs around the world is closely linked to the 
development of project finance, a financial technique based on lending 
against the cash flow of a project that is legally and economically self-
contained. Engel et al. explain why project – as opposed to corporate – 
finance is often the appropriate financial arrangement for PPPs. PPP 
projects are usually large enough to require independent management. 
There are also few synergies to be realised by building or operating two 
or more projects together. Infrastructure projects are often geographically 
fixed and far apart, and their assets immobile. This makes economies of 
scale site specific and project assets illiquid, limiting the residual value of 
assets if the project fails. Similarly, since production processes are usually 
subcontracted, economies of scale and scope are internalised by the 
subcontractees. It is efficient to bundle construction and operation. This 
generates incentives to design the project from the outset so that it both 
provides the service standards required by government and minimises 
life cycle costs.
The sources of finance change over the life cycle of a PPP project, 
matching its evolving pattern of risks and incentives. Bank loans have the 
advantage of bringing direct bank oversight of the project company 
during the construction phase, which is the riskiest phase of the project. 
In contrast, bond holders face high transaction costs in trying to monitor 
borrower behaviour. They are better suited to replace bank loans only 
once the project is operational. 
A recurrent criticism of PPPs is that they cost more per dollar of financing 
than government debt – the so-called PPP premium. The numbers that 
have been quoted for this difference in costs vary widely. According to Financing infrastructure  15           
Yescombe (2007) the cost of capital for a PPP is usually 200-300 basis 
points higher than the cost of public funds. Hence, it would seem that 
when governments decide between public provision and PPPs, they 
trade off a lower cost of funds under public provision against the 
supposedly higher efficiency of a PPP (leading to lower life cycle costs). 
But there are those who argue that there is no PPP premium, for instance 
because default risk under public provision is borne by taxpayers without 
being priced. In this case, the higher financing cost of PPPs reflects a just 
reward for carrying those risks.
Engel et al. examine three possible explanations for the PPP premium: (1) 
diversification of exogenous risk under PPPs vs. public provision; (2) 
endogenous risk and incentives in PPPs; (3) differences in financial and 
other transaction costs, which may make PPP finance more expensive.
(1) With frictionless, perfect capital markets, the diversification that can 
be achieved through the tax system is also achievable through the capital 
market. Hence no PPP premium would exist. The fact that a PPP premium 
exists points to capital market imperfections that give an edge to 
diversification through the tax system. But a diversification advantage of 
the public sector is not in itself an argument against PPPs, since there are 
risk sharing PPP contracts where the public sector bears most, if not all, 
exogenous risks. Thus, if lack of diversification in the private sector is 
behind the PPP premium, then this may be a reflection of faulty contract 
design rather than an inherent disadvantage of PPPs. 
(2) A PPP may have greater incentives for efficiency improvements 
compared with public provision. Under a PPP the same firm builds and 
operates the project. When service quality is contractible, then the firm 
has incentives to internalise life cycle costs during the construction 
phase. These incentives are not present under public provision. Hence 
the bundling of construction and operation provides an argument in 
favour of PPPs (Engel et al. 2008). Under a PPP, firm ownership of 
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innovation and more effective risk management. A final efficiency gain 
under PPPs may arise by avoiding agency costs associated with disbursing 
government funds. In order to avoid these costs, a PPP contract which 
relies on user fees may be preferable to society even if this moves risk to 
the firm (see Engel et al. 2007). In all these cases, imposing more risk on 
the firm translates into a PPP premium. To the extent that these risks are 
endogenous, however, they also give the sponsor firm incentives to 
reduce life cycle costs. In the words of Klein (1997): “[...] the cost of funds 
cannot be considered independently of the incentive system under 
which intermediaries collect them.” Achieving equivalent incentives with 
public provision would not necessarily be cheaper. 
(3) A third possible explanation for the PPP premium is that financing 
through PPPs has higher financial transaction costs. The complexity of 
the relationship between the sponsor, who owns the SPV, and the 
procurement agency, which oversees the contract and certifies 
compliance, creates transaction costs. These could potentially be so high 
that they negate the other advantages of PPPs. Complexity surrounding 
incentives and uncertainty has to be addressed with the help of legal, 
technical and financial advisors, along with estimation of demand risk. It 
has been estimated that these costs can reach 10% of the total cost of the 
project (Dos Santos Senna and Dutra Michel 2008; Yescombe 2007). But 
such expenses may be warranted, given that they provide a check on the 
potentially over-optimistic numbers provided by the government and 
the sponsor of the project. The more detailed nature of the contract – as 
compared to simpler contracts under public provision – limits the 
possibilities of costly ex post contract renegotiations.
On balance, Engel et al. are not convinced that PPP financing is inherently 
more costly than public provision financed with government debt. With 
adequate contracting, PPPs can replicate the intertemporal risk profile of 
public provision. This suggests that the so-called PPP premium may 
reflect faulty contractual schemes, which inefficiently assign exogenous 
risks to the private partner. In addition, the PPP premium may reflect Financing infrastructure  17           
endogenous risks that cannot be meaningfully separated from the cost-
cutting incentives embedded in PPPs, which lead to efficiency gains 
under PPPs. For these reasons, the higher cost of finance of PPPs is thus 
not in and of itself an argument in favour of public provision. In the case 
of a correctly designed PPP contract, the higher cost of capital may be 
the price to pay for the efficiency advantages of PPPs. 
While Engel et al. conclude that the higher costs of PPP financing may 
well be justified on efficiency grounds, another common argument in 
favour of PPPs seems to withstand scrutiny less well: saving money for 
credit-constrained governments. One of the reasons for PPPs has been 
the desire of governments to indulge in public works even when 
restricted by budgetary constraints (see Engel et al. 2009 and also House 
of Lords Select Committee on Economic Affairs 2010, p. 16). The fiscal 
savings from using PPPs instead of government borrowing to finance 
infrastructure investment disappear once proper intertemporal fiscal 
accounting is adopted. Although the government is able to reduce its 
borrowing thanks to the private financing of the PPP, it also has to forego 
user fee income in the future if it is to attract private investors. The 
government may also have to take on demand risk and guarantee the 
future income flow to the sponsor. Furthermore, it is sometimes argued 
that the use of PPPs avoids having to finance the infrastructure project 
with distortionary taxes and therefore should be preferred to public 
provision. But this “lower cost of public funds” argument in favour of PPPs 
is faulty as well. Under a PPP arrangement the government foregoes user 
fee revenue which could have been used to substitute for distortionary 
taxes. As demonstrated formally in Engel et al. (2007), this makes the 
choice between PPPs and public procurement fiscally irrelevant. The 
temptation of governments to use PPPs to alleviate their fiscal burden is 
partly the result of Eurostat rules. Unless construction risk or both 
demand and availability risk remain with the government, Eurostat rules 
allow governments to take PPPs off-balance sheet. But Engel et al. argue 
that these rules reflect a static view of risk allocation. From an 
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risk claimant, even if the firm bears all the demand risk during the life of 
the contract. Also, to the extent that taxpayers bear exogenous risk at a 
lower cost than the firm, the optimal contract eliminates that risk for the 
firm. Such a PPP contract increases the fiscal effect on the government 
budget relative to public provision.
To conclude, once an intertemporal view of government finances is 
adopted, PPP contracts have similar – sometimes identical – fiscal 
implications as public provision. This argues for giving PPP investments 
the same treatment as government investment on the government 
balance sheet.
3.    Infrastructure: A new asset class for 
investors?
Whatever reasons governments may have to engage the private sector in 
financing and operating infrastructure assets, they depend on the 
interest of private investors. Such interest clearly exists. Demand 
for infrastructure assets has been part of a broader diversification 
process of institutional and other investors in recent years, partly 
triggered by the bursting of the technology bubble at the 
beginning of the last decade.
The first presenter at the EIB Conference to take a closer look at 
infrastructure from the point of view of private investors was 
Georg Inderst (independent adviser, presenting a paper 
subsequently published as Inderst 2010 in the EIB Papers).
From the investors’ point of view, infrastructure holds the promise 
of being an entirely new asset class, which was unavailable to 
private investors while under public ownership. Whether in the form of 
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direct investment or indirectly through funds, infrastructure investments 
are widely believed to possess unique characteristics in terms of its risk-
return trade-off, inflation protection properties, time horizon or 
correlation with other assets. However, there is no proper financial theory 
to back the proposition of infrastructure as a separate asset class. Nor is 
there strong empirical evidence to support such a conjecture. One reason 
for this is that infrastructure assets are heterogeneous, with different 
types of infrastructure having very different economic characteristics. 
The traditional sector approach (e.g. energy, utility, transport) may well 
be more meaningful than a high-level aggregation to an ‘infrastructure 
asset class’. Empirical evidence suggests an alternative proposition, of 
either treating infrastructure simply as sub-asset class, or as particular 
sectors, within the conventional financing vehicle used (e.g. listed stocks, 
private equity, bonds). 
As shown earlier by Wagenvoort, the bulk of private infrastructure 
finance still takes the shape of corporate finance. Financial investors with 
an eye on infrastructure may, however, find securities issued in the 
investing firm’s name a poor substitute, since these pool the underlying 
infrastructure activities with the rest of the firm’s activities. Project-
financed infrastructure, in contrast, links the resulting securities 
exclusively to the underlying infrastructure assets. 
A growing number of specialised products have been launched by the 
financial industry to meet the demand from investors, presenting 
infrastructure as one of the new “alternative” asset classes (i.e. alternative 
to mainstream equities and government bonds). One key development 
in recent years is the emergence of infrastructure funds, which make 
infrastructure investment available to a larger set of financial investors 
that may not have the ability to invest directly in infrastructure projects. 
As reported by Inderst, according to Preqin (a data provider), the number 
of infrastructure funds have more than quadrupled in the past decade. 
According to a recent survey of infrastructure funds conducted by Towers 
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having US$185 bn in listed and unlisted infrastructure funds under 
management at the end of 2009, 59% of which were invested by pension 
funds. The survey also points to the growing share of infrastructure in the 
alternative investment segment, rising from 5% in 2007 to 12% in 2009. In 
the regional distribution of infrastructure assets, Europe leads with 43%, 
followed by North America (36%), Asia Pacific (16%) and other regions (5%).
Figure 5:  Unlisted infrastructure fundraising (2004-2009)







2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: Preqin
There are two types of infrastructure funds: listed and unlisted. Existing 
studies show that listed infrastructure funds have a very high correlation 
(around 80%) with the general stock market. This reduces the 
diversification benefits of including listed infrastructure funds separately 
in an investor portfolio. Unlisted infrastructure funds seem to be a 
different story. Inderst presents new results on the risk-return profile of 
unlisted infrastructure funds around the world, on the basis of the Preqin 
database. He finds that returns on unlisted infrastructure funds were 
comparable to overall private-equity returns (9%) in the decade up to the Financing infrastructure  21           
mid-2000s. Returns have since fallen steeply, though less for infrastructure 
than for non-infrastructure funds. Correlation analysis suggests that 
investment in unlisted infrastructure funds does present some scope for 
portfolio diversification. But this analysis also confirms that infrastructure 
assets are quite heterogeneous, which limits the scope for interpreting 
them as a separate asset class. Infrastructure appears to be simply a sub-
asset class within the conventional set of financing vehicles (e.g. listed 
and private equity, bonds).
How large a share of total financial investments by funds can infrastructure 
eventually attract? A starting point for answering this question are the 
target allocations to unlisted infrastructure funds by all investors, 
including the various financial firms, as recorded in the Preqin database. 
Three-quarters of investors indicate a range of 1 to 10%, but actual 
investment levels tend to be much lower. Drawing on various sources, 
Inderst finds that the asset allocation of institutional investors to specialist 
infrastructure vehicles is growing, but remains below 1% globally. If one 
includes their exposure to infrastructure via listed company shares 
(dominated by traditional utility stocks), the total infrastructure share of 
institutional investors is somewhat higher, but nevertheless remains 
below 5% globally. 
On the basis of stated intentions, the share of infrastructure funds in 
investors’ portfolios may rise in the future, and there are already signs 
that the cooling of interest in infrastructure amidst the financial crisis was 
temporary. According to Preqin, in August 2010, 43% of investors were 
planning new commitments to infrastructure funds during the next 12 
months, higher than a year earlier. Similarly, a survey by bfinance (2010) 
in May 2010 shows infrastructure as the most attractive asset class in the 
alternative segment. Around one-third of respondents consistently 
report a longer-term intention of increasing the asset allocation to 
infrastructure assets. Actual numbers are notably smaller, however. In the 
past year only 4-6% of respondents claim to have actually increased their 
infrastructure allocations.22             Financing infrastructure
 
If the upbeat intentions were realised, there would be massive new 
demand for infrastructure assets. To illustrate this point, Inderst calculates 
that a 3% asset allocation shift into infrastructure assets by pension funds 
globally would result in an additional demand of around US$ 700 bn.
It is not clear what exactly inserts the large wedge between desired and 
actual allocations, but what is obvious is that there remains a substantial 
gap in our understanding of how infrastructure funds perform. There are 
several reasons for this. Some are related to data availability and quality. 
For instance, the history of unlisted infrastructure vehicles is still rather 
short. In addition, data are often proprietary and not made public. 
Independent evaluators have not begun to collect data independently 
on any scale. Infrastructure funds and investors use different benchmarks 
and there are no agreed performance and risk reporting standards. The 
performance uncertainty is also related to some inherent characteristics 
of infrastructure assets, including the combining of infrastructure assets 
that have very different characteristics. This in turn may explain why 
different infrastructure funds have displayed very different historical 
performance. 
There have been a number of efforts aiming to improve our knowledge 
of past performance of infrastructure assets, using different data sources. 
Many researchers have relied on listed infrastructure indices to construct 
historical performance records of infrastructure as an asset class. But 
such indices are based on publicly traded shares of utility, transport, 
energy and other infrastructure companies, whose performance may be 
very different from pure infrastructure assets. Alternatively, one can 
deduct historical performance from listed infrastructure funds, such as 
those listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. But performance of the 
various listed funds displays a very high degree of dispersion.
Another approach to assess historical performance is to draw on results 
as reported by investors. The limited evidence that exists on this suggests 
that performance varies substantially both across investors and across Financing infrastructure  23           
time. Some work has been done to produce historical time series and 
performance figures for unlisted infrastructure funds. Analysing quarterly 
returns of five unlisted Australian infrastructure and utilities funds over a 
ten-year period, Peng and Newell (2007) found that both risks and returns 
compare very favourably to other asset classes, with an average annual 
return for unlisted infrastructure funds of 14%, double that of bonds and 
somewhat higher than that of stocks. In a follow-up study that also 
incorporates the early stages of the crisis, Newell et al. (forthcoming) find 
that the performance of these unlisted infrastructure funds have 
withstood the crisis well and more generally display much less variation 
across time than other asset classes. Finkenzeller et al. (2010) analyse 
similar data over a longer time period. They find that unlisted 
infrastructure and utility have had similar returns as equities and bonds, 
but below those of property and listed infrastructure. However, they also 
find that unlisted infrastructure comes out with the lowest returns 
volatility. On balance, the Australian performance studies of unlisted 
funds find relatively high risk-adjusted returns and relatively strong 
resilience in the market downturn, although these results need to be 
viewed cautiously in view of the relatively narrow sample and short time 
period covered. In particular, most of the data used pertains to the period 
after 2000, during which it may have been the case that infrastructure 
assets enjoyed a sustained cyclical upswing.
Further exploring the scope for private financing of infrastructure, 
Christoph Kaserer (Technische Universität München, presenting 
a paper written together with Florian Bitsch and Axel Buchner, 
published in the EIB Papers as Bitsch et al. 2010) provided an 
analysis of the risk, return and cash flow characteristics of 
infrastructure investments and compare them to non-infrastructure 
investments. It is generally argued in the literature that 
infrastructure investments offer typical characteristics such as 
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long-term, stable and predictable, inflation-linked returns with low 
correlation to other assets (Inderst 2009). Drawing on a unique data set 
of global infrastructure and non-infrastructure investments done by 
(private equity-like) unlisted funds (CEPRES database), the authors put a 
number of these “conventional wisdoms” to the test. To some extent, 
their findings corroborate the established view, but some of the results 
do not. 
Although addressing broadly similar questions, there are two important 
differences between Bitsch et al. and Inderst (2010), which add to their 
complementarity. The first is that Inderst uses fund-level data, while 
Bitsch et al. draw on data from individual deals involving funds. The focus 
is on the equity participation of portfolio funds. The second difference is 
that, unlike Inderst, Bitsch et al. only look at completed transactions, with 
no fund capital left in the portfolio. This means for instance that the 
calculated rates of return are final.
The main results are as follows. First, in terms of risk differences 
between infrastructure and non-infrastructure deals, results are mixed. 
The authors do not find evidence supporting the hypothesis that 
infrastructure investments offer more stable cash (out-) flows than 
non-infrastructure investments. It appears to be true, however, that 
default risk – or downside risk more generally – is significantly lower in 
infrastructure investments than in non-infrastructure investments. 
Second, as far as returns are concerned, infrastructure deals have 
higher average and median returns, as measured by the investment 
multiples and internal rates of return. This result also holds when 
separating the sample into venture capital and private-equity deals, 
and most differences are statistically significant. This is an interesting 
finding as it contradicts the traditional view that infrastructure 
investments exhibit low levels of risk and, consequently, provide only 
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Third, there is some evidence that the higher average returns reflect 
higher market risk. For one thing, the data sample contains only equity 
investments, and leverage ratios of infrastructure portfolio companies 
are higher than for their non-infrastructure counterparts. For another, 
returns to infrastructure fund investments are more strongly correlated 
with the performance of public-equity markets than returns to non-
infrastructure fund investments.
Fourth, European infrastructure investments are found to have consistently 
higher returns than their non-European counterparts. Bitsch et al. 
hypothesize that this might be related to the fact that Europe has seen 
the largest volume of privatisations, especially in the infrastructure 
sectors. It could well be that the ex ante return expectation in privatization 
transactions is higher, either because of defective privatization 
mechanisms or because of higher political risk. Concerning the latter, 
there is some evidence that the regulatory environment has an impact 
on returns. Specifically, deals in the transportation sector have 
significantly higher returns than those in other infrastructure sectors, 
probably reflecting less independent regulation and hence, higher 
political risk in transportation as compared to the utilities or energy 
sectors.
Fifth, the empirical evidence does not support some other claims made 
in the literature. In particular, returns to infrastructure funds are not 
strongly linked to inflation and seem little influenced by management 
experience, and their cash flow durations are not any different from 
those of non-infrastructure deals. It is also interesting to see that, unlike 
venture capital and private-equity transactions at large, infrastructure 
investments do not appear to be subject to the so-called “money chasing 
deals” phenomenon.
Thus, the allegedly bond-like characteristics of infrastructure deals have 
not been confirmed. This is shown by the fact that infrastructure 
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non-infrastructure investments. The returns showing a positive 
correlation to public-equity markets and no strong inflation linkage also 
point to equity-like rather than bond-like characteristics. 
Nevertheless, this study does support the perception that infrastructure 
investments have some special characteristics that are of interest for 
institutional investors. Lower downside risk is certainly an important 
feature in this context. However, it is unlikely that the infrastructure 
market offers a free lunch. Even though it is true that returns have been 
attractive in the past, it cannot be ruled out that these returns are driven 
by higher market risk.
4.    How to encourage the expansion of 
private infrastructure finance
Previous presenters hinted at the notable gap between the 
potential and the actual roles that private investors play in 
infrastructure finance. Dieter Helm (University of Oxford, 
presenting a paper published as Helm 2010 in the EIB Papers) 
delved deeper into the likely sources of this gap. He also stressed 
the need to address this gap in light of the fiscal constraints facing 
governments in the wake of the financial crisis. The challenge is 
to match the need for a major expansion in infrastructure 
investment across Europe with the constraints of a post-crisis 
economy.
As explained by Helm, the difficulties of expanding private 
infrastructure finance are inseparable from the economics of 
infrastructure. Many infrastructure assets form part of networks and 
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systems, which is what gives infrastructure assets the characteristics of a 
public good. Because of these characteristics, governments are intimately 
involved in infrastructure provision. They decide on the systems and the 
frameworks from a social optimisation perspective. They also control the 
planning. The private sector typically does the work (the capital 
expenditures, or CAPEX) and all finance is ultimately private, either 
directly or through the tax system.
Infrastructure involves the creation of long-lived assets with high sunk 
costs, followed by low marginal costs for each additional user. Once 
completed, the difference between the marginal and average costs is 
thus very large, as only the latter takes the sunk cost into account. Private 
investors can only recover their initial sunk costs if they enjoy a sufficiently 
large cash flow, reflecting average rather than marginal cost. Historically, 
one solution has been to recognise that the provision of much 
infrastructure has monopoly powers. A private investor can in principle 
rely on monopoly rents to recover sunk costs. Road and bridge tolls 
played a part in the early development of roads, for example. 
Such market power may not last long enough for the investor to 
recuperate the up-front costs, however. One problem with monopoly 
rents is that these attract new entrants and the development of 
alternative technologies that may chip away at the monopoly rents. In 
almost all major network systems, technological progress is a real threat. 
In electricity, smart grids and meters threaten existing assets. In 
communications, copper wires face threats from new transmission 
mechanisms, including wireless ones. For nuclear and wind technologies, 
over the next decade or two, both may face new cheaper rivals. The 
longer the lives of the assets, the greater is the risk of stranding. Long-
term contracts and regulatory regimes are thus necessary to provide 
some income guarantees to the investors. 
Predictable regulation and long term contracts are also needed to 
prevent governments from reneging on their promises to the private 28             Financing infrastructure
 
investors. The temptation to do so is the result of a fundamental time 
inconsistency problem that characterises much infrastructure. The 
government has to promise prices based on average cost for private 
investors to come forward (otherwise the investors will not be able to 
recuperate their initial fixed costs); yet once the asset or network is up 
and running, the government is tempted to break the promise and drive 
prices down to marginal costs to increase the number of users and hence, 
consumer welfare. This problem of credible commitment lies at the heart 
of infrastructure policy. If governments cannot credibly commit to not 
expropriate the assets once they are in place, there will be little incentive 
for investors to build them in the first place.
Efforts to address the basic time inconsistency problem have tended to 
center on a transfer of ownership of infrastructure assets to the private 
sector, combined with the creation of arms’ length regulatory frameworks 
to provide mechanisms for credible commitment. The practical way in 
which these questions have been addressed is through institutional 
design – through the legal framework and through the development of 
arms’ length regulatory bodies. In countries such as the UK, where 
pragmatism about the public interest dominates over courts and legal 
constraints, the emphasis has been on creating independent institutions 
as intermediaries between the government and the investors. Unlike 
planning – where decisions are made about the systems and specific 
projects and licenses granted – the sunk cost issue arises from the capital 
expenditure, not the granting of permission to carry out the projects. 
The regulator is an intermediary that guarantees that the government 
will honour its commitment. Thus, regulators are supposed to have due 
regard to investor protection. In the utility sector, a host of new regulatory 
bodies have been created, partially with this purpose in mind. Such 
measures have not typically extended to private finance initiatives (PFIs) 
and PPP contracts. This has tended to result in higher costs of capital, but 
also the use of other mechanisms to give investors security, including 
claims on the assets and further contracts on maintenance and ancillary 
revenue streams. Financing infrastructure  29           
In setting prices, regulators have typically been required to respect the 
need for a return both on new and existing assets. The guiding principle of 
price regulation was to ensure a minimum return on assets for investors, 
but to do this, the question “on what” had to be answered. In the process of 
ensuring that private investors would recuperate their past sunk costs, the 
concept of a “regulated asset base” (RAB) was developed. This in turn led to 
a mechanism by which the creation of new assets (CAPEX) could migrate 
into old assets once completed and then transferred to the RAB. The crucial 
point here is that the RAB represents the sunk costs, and the RAB mechanism 
thereby became a means to addressing the time inconsistency problem. 
The RAB concept can and should be extended to infrastructure more 
generally – and across Europe, but it requires the creation of new RABs 
and new intermediary institutions such as the proposed UK Green 
Investment Bank. Such an infrastructure bank would buy completed 
projects, put a guarantee around them to create RABs and sell the assets 
to investors (e.g. pension funds) in a debt-financed package. This activity 
would require little own capital.
Helm also stresses that the urgency of providing an exit strategy for new 
infrastructure CAPEX has been compounded by the economic crisis. The 
impact of the crisis has been ambivalent. For completed CAPEX in formal 
RABs, the impact has probably been benign. Quantitative Easing has 
even involved the state buying RAB-backed utility bonds. In contrast, for 
CAPEX itself, the impact has been largely negative, especially where 
there is demand risk for the services the infrastructure is intended to 
provide. Providing a broader RAB-based exit through an infrastructure 
bank is an obvious way to greatly alleviate the position.
If these suggested measures were adopted, they would according to 
Helm have a major impact on the delivery of the infrastructure ambitions 
of European governments. The fate of the green agenda is in particular at 
stake. Fortunately there are solutions. The question is whether they will 
be adopted fast enough to meet the targets.30             Financing infrastructure
 
As a discussant of the second session, Nicolás Merigó (Marguerite Fund) 
emphasised that the “private” financial investors in infrastructure are a 
very heterogeneous group, spanning pension funds, banks, insurance 
companies and sovereign wealth funds. Each of these investor types face 
different sets of goals, incentives and requirements. As regards equity 
investment in project finance deals, Merigó stressed that non-
financial investors (corporate developers) dominate the market. 
In the first half of 2010, such non-financial investors accounted for 
nearly 90% of global equity invested in project finance deals (or 
roughly USD15 bn out of USD17 bn). Finally, Merigó recognized 
that analysis of infrastructure assets, investors and markets remain 
in early stages, and that there is plenty of scope for further 
empirical research. In light of the observed importance of equity 
investment by non-financial corporates, this is an area that in 
particular warrants further study.
5.    Infrastructure finance and public 
policies
The UK has long been in the forefront in terms of private financing of 
infrastructure. Yet the need for private participation has increased 
even further because of necessary fiscal consolidation, in the UK 
as elsewhere. James Stewart (Infrastructure UK – HM Treasury) 
provided an overview of the UK National Infrastructure Plan 2010. 
The UK National Infrastructure Plan for the first time sets out a 
broad, integrated, cross-sectoral vision and plan for the substantial 
infrastructure investment required to underpin the UK’s economic 
growth. This plan will act as a common reference point for the 
public and private sectors to achieve more effective infrastructure 
development.  It will be updated on an annual basis.
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Stewart pointed to research demonstrating the favourable economic 
effects of past infrastructure investment in the UK. There is a clear 
correlation between investment in infrastructure and long-term growth. 
The OECD found that, between 1970 and 2005, investment in UK roads, 
rail and electricity generating capacity had a stronger positive effect on 
the level of GDP per capita, and on short term growth, than other types 
of capital investment (Égert et al. 2009). Failing to make the right choices 
risks slowing down economic growth and ultimately jeopardises the UK’s 
international competitiveness.
To meet the growing requirements for spending on infrastructure, there 
is a need to use limited public funds wisely and unlock every possible 
source of private sector investment. The National Infrastructure Plan 2010 
sets out a broad vision of the infrastructure investment required to 
underpin the UK’s growth (HM Treasury 2010), embracing the options 
opened up by new technology – for example, in the roll out of super fast 
broadband, in offshore wind arrays and in high-speed rail. The role of a 
Government in this work is clear. It is to specify what infrastructure we 
need, identify the key barriers to achieving investment and mobilise the 
resources, both public and private, to make it happen.
According to Stewart, the UK is today one of the most expensive countries 
in which to build infrastructure. For example, civil engineering works cost 
some sixty percent more than in Germany. To address this issue, there is a 
need to improve the UK planning system, bring down construction costs, 
improve the quality of data to inform decision taking, and initiate 
programmes to look at cross-sectoral independencies, resilience and 
engineering innovation.
Infrastructure UK are investigating -- in collaboration with wider UK 
government -- how to reduce the cost of delivery of civil engineering 
works for major infrastructure projects. Initial findings indicate a range of 
reasons for higher costs of UK infrastructure. In particular, there are issues 
in the commissioning, early project formulation and pre-construction 32             Financing infrastructure
 
phases. In these early phases, policy-related factors, for example the UK 
planning and consents regime, and regulatory standards, impact on the 
whole infrastructure sector, including public and private-sector 
investments.
Infrastructure needs are changing in the face of several 
megatrends that will affect the economy in coming decades. 
Clearly, with current transport, energy and other economic 
infrastructure contributing a non-negligible share to greenhouse 
gas emissions (Figure 6), global warming has far-reaching 
implications for infrastructure investment going forward. 
Marianne Fay (World Bank, presenting a paper co-authored with 
Atushi Iimi and Baptiste Perissin-Fabert, which has been published 
as Fay et al. 2010 in the EIB Papers) spoke on “the greening of 
infrastructure – challenges and opportunities”. 
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While the link from infrastructure to climate change has received a fair 
amount of attention in the literature, this has not been the case for the 
reverse relationship. By investigating also the impact of climate change 
on infrastructure (with a focus on developing countries), Fay and her 
collaborators thus bring valuable insight to a previously under-researched 
area. 
As a starting point, Fay thus began by stressing that indeed the 
relationship between climate change and infrastructure goes in both 
directions. First, since infrastructure (defined here as transport, power, 
water and sanitation) is a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions, 
a greening of infrastructure is needed to slow the pace of climate change. 
Second, and especially in developing countries, there is a need to make 
infrastructure less vulnerable to the effects of global warming. The paper 
by Fay et al. argues that both mitigation and adaptation concerns will 
increase the costs of infrastructure. Estimates of the additional costs 
associated with adaptation are modest but this is due to the way they are 
calculated: as the incremental costs of adapting new infrastructure rather 
than the costs of improving resilience. The latter would require first and 
foremost addressing the large infrastructure deficit that characterizes 
most developing countries. In fact, adaptation and mitigation costs pale 
in comparison to the unmet infrastructure funding needs.
Because infrastructure is long-lived, the need to put in place greener 
infrastructure is urgent. But the long lead time also introduces substantial 
uncertainty into the decision-making process. There is for instance 
substantial uncertainty with respect to the geographical distribution of 
climate change impacts. Other uncertain factors include the pace and 
direction of technological progress and the size of future carbon prices, 
both of which affect the optimal design of infrastructure. Increased 
uncertainty calls for more robust decision-making. Rather than selecting 
a single “optimal” strategy, it may be better to opt for the one that is the 
most likely to generate a consensus among stakeholders and/or to 
minimize the impacts of a bad surprise. Robust decision-making does 34             Financing infrastructure
 
not help decision makers predict what will happen but to design better 
choices and improve the ability to cope with low-probability, undesirable 
events.
While climate change may have several negative consequences for 
infrastructure finance in developing countries, not all is negative. One 
positive side effect of climate change might be that it helps bring 
attention to the need to better address environmental issues in 
infrastructure design at the same time as it increases the value of 
environmental co-benefits. Climate change increases the already high 
returns to maintenance (and to operational management more broadly), 
hitherto relatively neglected in developing countries. If the foreseen 
effects of climate change elevate the awareness of high returns to 
maintenance, it could possibly trigger action that would be economically 
sound also in the absence of climate change. Further, high-income 
countries have pledged resources to assist developing countries both in 
adapting to and in mitigating climate change. It is reasonable to expect 
that a share of these resources will constitute a net addition to domestic 
and concessional resources available for infrastructure funding.
Unfortunately climate finance for developing countries remains modest 
relative to needs. Adaptation funding needs to increase at the same time 
as it moves away from a narrow focus on incremental costs. The 
experience of the EU accession funds, which also had to tackle the 
question of additionality, offers some useful lessons. Mitigation funds 
suffer from the absence of agreement that could generate more certainty 
and stability around a carbon price and around the potential size of the 
offset markets. Several ideas are offered that could help raise additional 
funding but these require some commitments by high-income 
countries.
One issue that is not tackled in this study and requires further research is 
the extent to which climate change may affect private participation in 
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country infrastructure finance. As climate change increases uncertainty, 
it should increase the cost of capital and hence, make PPI more costly and 
possibly more difficult to attract at least in the most affected countries. 
We can also expect that climate change and the need for new 
environmental regulations will affect the optimal regulatory regimes that 
govern PPPs.
Antonio Estache (Université libre de Bruxelles, presenting a 
paper published in the EIB Papers as Estache 2010) expanded on 
this policy discussion to address efficiency, equity and fiscal 
consequences of public and private infrastructure financing 
options in developing countries. His overview of the main 
dimensions of infrastructure finance in developing countries 
shows that quite a bit has been learned on these issues since the 
mid-1990s. For developing countries, infrastructure investment is 
a much longer-term concern than a short-term bet on recovery 
from a crisis. In many areas, the need for basic infrastructure 
investment is substantial. Many people in developing countries 
lack access to electricity, water, telecommunication facilities as well as 
common transport infrastructures such as roads and ports. Better access 
to health and education are similarly essential policy goals in their own 
right. But infrastructure also plays an instrumental role in fostering long-
term economic growth. Recent surveys of the literature on the 
infrastructure-growth nexus confirm that the poorer the country, the 
more infrastructure matters for growth. 
The private sector remains a limited source of infrastructure finance in 
developing countries. Estache points to both efficiency and equity 
arguments for a substantial continued government role in financing 
infrastructure. Regarding efficiency, private provision and financing 
of infrastructure depends on the quality of competition and 
regulation, which is often found wanting outside the advanced countries. 
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As regards equity, Estache cautions against the wide underestimation of 
the public-sector financing support needed to serve the poorest and 
ensure that services are offered at prices consistent with their ability to pay. 
In its support to the reform of regulation, the international community 
needs to learn from widespread past experience with inequitable provision, 
pricing and subsidisation of infrastructure services. Limited ability to pay is 
a major obstacle to private financing and provision of infrastructure, as 
illustrated by the large difference in infrastructure cost recovery between 
high and low income countries (Figure 7). Full cost recovery would require 
the average citizen of South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa to spend 25 to 35 
percent of income on infrastructure services, which would be impossible. 
The optimal financing approach therefore cannot be made independently 
of an analysis of the population’s ability to pay.
Figure 7:    Infrastructure cost recovery across country income groups 
average 1999-2004)
Partial cost recovery for operating expenditure
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International donors and financiers play a large role in realising needed 
infrastructure in developing countries where neither public nor private 
funding is available in sufficient quantities. In recent years, China has 
become a major international source of infrastructure finance in 
developing countries. Over time, pension funds and other institutional 
investors could also emerge as major sources of international financing. 
For the time being, however, it is hard to overestimate the role of 
development agencies in the financing of infrastructure. There is a need 
for more effective coordination between different external donors and 
financiers so as to reduce the fragmentation of financing sources of large 
infrastructure projects. Improved coordination should also be reflected 
in the collective efforts to deal with major policy challenges, including 
the greening of the sector, corruption, improvements in monitoring the 
performance of the use of resources, and governance of the sector. As 
network externalities extend across borders, many electricity, telecom 
and transport projects also require international coordination allowing 
transnational infrastructure needs to be addressed jointly among groups 
of countries.
Data limitations remain a major obstacle to better understand the 
infrastructure needs in developing countries, and to the policy and 
institutional changes needed to meet them. It will be challenging to get 
the data and the models to assess the direction that the international 
community and national governments in developing countries need to 
follow to identify win-win situations in the sector. But it is a reasonable 
way of making sure that the scarce international and national financial 
resources allocated to the sector deliver cost-effective infrastructure at a 
greater speed.38             Financing infrastructure
 
6.  Concluding remarks
by EIB Vice President Plutarchos Sakellaris
The starting point for the conference was that Europe faces large 
and indeed growing infrastructure needs in coming years and 
decades. These reflect both the need of replacing ageing existing 
infrastructure stock and the need for new infrastructure brought 
on by emerging megatrends, such as ageing and climate change. 
Meeting these infrastructure needs in an environment where 
public finance in Europe is constrained by fiscal consolidation will 
require a greater contribution from private financial sources.
As pointed out by several speakers at the conference, private finance has 
up to now not been forthcoming in the amounts needed to fill the gap 
between available public funds and investment needs. The conference 
suggested several critical elements where action is needed.
As shown by Rien Wagenvoort, infrastructure finance remains dominated 
by government and corporate finance. Although theoretically the case 
for project financing of infrastructure is strong, in practice this source has 
so far accounted for a small fraction of overall financing.
One bottleneck to more private finance was stressed by Eduardo Engel, 
who showed that the higher observed cost of private infrastructure 
finance was partly the result of faulty contract design, especially as 
regards the allocation of risk between the public and private sectors. 
Improved contract design is essential to attract private investors to the 
kind of long-term investments that characterise most infrastructure.
Dieter Helm pointed to another critical bottleneck. According to Helm, 
regulatory failure needlessly introduces uncertainties for private investors 
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as regards the future return on infrastructure investment. The uncertainty 
is partly propelled by the temptation of governments to renege ex post 
on the promises made to the investor ex ante that it would be allowed to 
charge sufficiently high user charges to recuperate the up-front fixed 
costs.
Georg Inderst presented evidence suggesting that a lack of reliable 
information may also impede higher private sector financing of 
infrastructure. We need to understand better the characteristics of 
infrastructure assets so that they can find their right place in investor 
portfolios. Two pioneering empirical studies were presented at the 
conference (one by Inderst and the other by Christoph Kaserer) that 
brought us closer to this end, but clearly this is an area where more work 
is needed. On the basis of existing evidence, the pooling of quite different 
infrastructure assets seems to contribute to the difficulty in identifying 
any robust financial properties in existing infrastructure-linked financial 
assets.
Antonio Estache brought home the important message that developed 
and developing countries are worlds apart when it comes to infrastructure 
finance. In developing countries, private financing of infrastructure 
remains very limited, for several reasons. One critical issue is that 
dependence on user fees becomes unviable when large portions of the 
users lack the ability to pay. Furthermore, the legal and regulatory 
environment is often too underdeveloped to attract private investors 
into long-term contracts. 
Developing countries are expected to be the most severely affected by 
climate change. As discussed by Marianne Fay, climate change affects 
future infrastructure investment in two ways. First, there is a need for 
investment in infrastructure that is more resilient to the effects of climate 
change. Second, since infrastructure is a major source of greenhouse gas 
emissions, a greener infrastructure needs to be put in place in coming 
decades, in developed and developing countries alike. On a positive side, 40             Financing infrastructure
 
however, widespread awareness of climate change has also increased the 
willingness of advanced countries to contribute to the financing of 
infrastructure in developing countries.
A last but not least message to highlight from the conference is that of 
James Stewart, who showed that infrastructure is more than just an issue 
of finding the fiscal space for governments or an asset allocation decision 
for the private sector. Fundamentally, infrastructure is a public policy 
issue, which requires long-term planning regardless of how it is ultimately 
financed. It is thus up to the government to decide what infrastructure 
the economy needs, and where.Financing infrastructure  41           
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Annex:   Infrastructure finance and the EIB - Three illustrative 
examples
by the EIB Directorate for Operations in the EU and Candidate 
Countries
1.    2020 European Fund for Energy, Climate Change and 
Infrastructure (the Marguerite Fund)
Infrastructure projects need both debt and equity: therefore, in addition 
to its significant infrastructure lending activity, EIB has, together with 
partners, invested in a series of equity funds for infrastructure. These 
funds are an important source of equity finance for infrastructure asset 
creation. 
Recently, in response to the conclusions of the European Council of 
December 2008, the European public financial institutions, the European 
Investment Bank, Caisse des Dépôts et Consignations, Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti, Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, Insituto de Crédito Oficial and 
Powszechna Kasa Oszędności (“Core Sponsors”), in collaboration with the 
European Commission launched the 2020 European Fund for Energy, 
Climate Change and Infrastructure, the so called Marguerite Fund. The 
Fund is designed to contribute to the development of the Infrastructure 
market as well as the European Economic Recovery Plan by financing the 
implementation of strategically important European Policy objectives in 
Energy/Climate, Renewables and Transport sectors.  
The Fund’s investment policy will focus on asset creation (green field 
investments) throughout the European Union in three priority sectors: 
Trans-European Transport Networks (TEN-T), Trans-European Energy 
Networks (TEN-E) and renewable energy. The Fund is managed by an 
independent and exclusive advisory team based in Luxembourg with a 
branch office in Paris. The Fund operates on private sector principles with 
market standard return targets, while retaining specific public sector 
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Management Boards of the Fund, while the investment decisions are 
made by an Investment Committee that has no such representatives. The 
Supervisory Board cannot interfere with the management of the Fund 
and will focus on overall supervision and strategic orientation of the 
Fund. 
The Fund raised more than EUR 700m in its first closing and will target 
final closing with EUR 1.5 bn commitments from both public and private 
investors by then end of 2011. The Fund has also an associated Debt 
Co-financing Initiative, under which the Core Sponsors and other 
interested parties have expressed interest to provide debt-financing to 
projects the Fund invests in. 
The Fund invests in minority positions in project companies implementing 
infrastructure investments. It has standard portfolio diversification 
requirements ensuring that the Fund is not disproportionally investing in 
any one EU member state nor projects sponsored by the same 
counterpart. The Fund has a four-year (extendable by two one-year 
periods) investment period and has a term of 20 years. 
The Marguerite Fund is expected to be a model in the future for other 
similar public and private funds in the EU: both at regional and national 
level for different infrastructure sectors in view of the approach taken to 
combining market principles while still supporting public policy objectives.
2.  Autobahn A5 PPP Ten
The successful closing of A5 sent a crucial signal, amidst economic 
turmoil, for future A-Model projects, when the German government was 
launching its second batch of projects. LGTT (Loan Guarantee Instrument 
for Trans-European Transport Network Projects) made the project 
bankable in difficult economic conditions and was the first time the 
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Scope of the A5 project 
The project is a part of the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) 
and is located on a strategic road corridor in the south–west of Germany 
in the western part of the state Baden-Württemberg between Karlsruhe 
and Offenburg. The autobahn runs parallel to the French border and the 
French Region Alsace, i.e. Département du Bas-Rhin.
This Project’s concession has a duration of 30 years (2009-2039) and 
covers 59.8 km, including 40km of construction/upgrade plus the 
operation and maintenance of an adjoining already widened 20km 
section. It involves the design, construction, operation and maintenance 
and financing of the works to be carried out. The concessionaire will gain 
revenues from the “Toll Collect” truck toll system, based on real HGV 
traffic numbers on the concession.
The Concessionaire
In February 2009, the German authorities awarded the €600m A5 PPP 
contract to the consortium led by Vinci. The successful “Via Solutions 
Südwest” SPV includes: 
  • Vinci Concessions 
  • Meridiam Infrastructure 
  • Kirchhoff (subsidiary company of Strabag)
Via Solutions Südwest, was able to close the funding for the project on 
30 March 2009, only two months after the contract was awarded.
Financial Structure 
Due to the economic environment, the main challenge was to raise the 
required amounts of senior debt while maintaining reasonable financial 
costs. A number of particularities influenced the development of the 
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  • The project revenues will fully rely on tolls collected from heavy goods 
vehicles, there is no availability payment component;
  • The project does not include up-front grants as per the previous 
A-Model projects. 
  • The discount amount on toll revenues (Abzugsbetrag) is constant in 
nominal terms over the whole concession period, thus having a higher 
impact on the earlier years; 
  • The project generates unsecured traffic revenues from the outset, thus 
requiring contingent funds to cope with possible traffic downsides 
during construction; 
The funding structure was therefore based on three pillars: 
  - a 28-year long-term financing from the EIB, for close to 50% of the 
senior funding requirement; 
  - a commercial facility structured as a “soft” 11 years mini-perm, with 
refinancing risk for the remainder of the concession period; 
  - a series of credit enhancement measures through stand-by lines 
provided by the sponsors 
  - a LGTT stand-by mezzanine facility provided by EIB (Loan Guarantee 
for TEN-T Projects) 
LGTT3  
The LGTT instrument was introduced by the EIB to facilitate bank funding 
for Trans European Network (TENs) transport projects subject to a 
revenue risk. 
The LGTT was made available as a one-off drawdown at a fixed point in 
time to partially repay the senior debt in the case where a certain traffic 
3    LGTT is the acronym for Loan Guarantee Instrument for Trans-European Transport Network 
Projects. It is an innovative financial instrument set up and developed jointly by the Euro-
pean Commission and the European Investment Bank (EIB) which aims at facilitating a larger 
participation of the private sector involvement in the financing of Trans-European Transport 
Network infrastructure (“TEN-T”).48             Financing infrastructure
 
downside threshold is met. This is designed to a) facilitate a refinancing 
in a downside scenario and b) improve the senior lender’s position 
throughout loan life by improving the cover ratios on the outstanding 
senior debt. 
If the LGTT guarantee is called upon, then the EIB becomes a subordinated 
lender to the project, ahead of any payment to the equity providers and 
related financings. The EIB, by taking such subordinated risk through the 
LGTT guarantee, helps the project to cope with the revenue risk of the 
early years of operation while relying on the long-term perspective of 
the project to recover its loan. 
The LGTT is a replicable structure, with bespoke elements adapted to the 
particulars of each project. The sponsors recognized the benefit of LGTT 
as a substitute to expensive contingent equity and, at the same time, 
LGTT benefits to senior lenders providing a AAA rated contingent 
security reducing default risk.
Conclusion
  • A5 proved to be a particularly challenging project with extensive traffic 
risk and no availability payment element; 
  • The procurement process was impacted by the onset of the financial 
crisis; 
  • A major constraint was the public sector pressure to hold the bidders 
to their original bid price, in changed market conditions; 
  • The project eventually benefits from a robust financial structure, 
through a reduced gearing, subordinated funding features for both 
equity and debt and the introduction of LGTT to cope with downside 
scenarios; 
  • Relatively attractive funding terms were obtained as a result of the 
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3.  Cape Verde Wind Power PPP
The Bank has provided EUR 30m to design, construct and operate 
onshore wind farms on four islands in the Cape Verde archipelago. It is 
one of the largest wind projects in Africa and the first renewable energy 
public private partnership in sub-Saharan Africa. The project will provide 
over 28MW of electricity generating capacity and help the archipelago 
reach an ambitious target of ensuring that 25% of local power needs are 
provided by renewable energy by 2012 and 50% by 2020. 
Cape Verde has outstanding wind resources, but the country relies 
heavily on expensive imported fossil fuel for power generation. The wind 
power project will reduce that reliance substantially. Alongside 
significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions the project will also 
increase access to electricity in Cape Verde and help establish wind 
energy as a reliable source of non-polluting renewable power on the 
islands. 
The project has been developed in a public-private partnership between 
the government of Cape Verde, local power utility Electra, and Infraco, a 
privately managed donor-funded infrastructure development company. 
The EIB was appointed lead financier to the Project and has used it’s 
experience and expertise in the renewables sector to help develop and 
implement the project. The financial structure is typical project finance, 
with a long-term finance facility of 15 years provided by EIB. The project 
will be build on a full engineering, procurement and construction 
contract with a 12-year service agreement with wind turbine manufacturer 
Vestas.
The project will increase the national utility’s total installed generation 
capacity from 66 to 94 megawatts. The first plant on the island of Santiago 
is expected to be tested and commissioned by June 2011 with all four 
plants scheduled to become operational by the fourth quarter of 2011.50             Financing infrastructure
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